



What should we do? 
#11 Re-learn how to 
govern risk 
The pandemic is forcing us to change 
direction, to rethink what we do 
and how we do it. 
We ask our experts: 
where should we go from here? 
Re-learn how to govern risk 
by Professor Simon Deakin and Dr Gaofeng Meng 
As the pandemic crisis has played out across the world, different types of government 
have taken different approaches to controlling the spread of virus and supporting 
citizens – with different outcomes. Can we start to draw conclusions on how best to 
govern future catastrophic risks? 
In the 12 months since Wuhan Municipal Health Commission reported a cluster of 
cases of pneumonia from which a novel coronavirus was eventually identified, 
global efforts to contain it have gone from understanding SARS-CoV-2 and the 
disease it generates, to studying human behaviour and how the virus is transmitted. 
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But there are some questions that virology and epidemiology alone cannot answer, 
such as why COVID-19 infection and mortality rates differ so widely across 
countries. 
We now know that the impacts of COVID-19 are highly skewed not just by personal 
factors such as age and underlying health but by social factors such as occupation, 
income and access to basic goods including housing. And we’ve also seen a wide 
divergence in states’ reactions to the virus and in the control and support measures 
they have taken. 
“Re-learning how to manage risk can be a template 
for the future governance of anthropogenic crises, of 
which COVID-19 is likely just the harbinger.” 
Understanding the role played by institutions, both public and private, in framing 
the way that risks of the kind posed by COVID-19 are managed has been 
comparatively neglected. Our recently published research on the governance of 
COVID-19 set out to fill this gap as an essential step for the future control of 
pandemics and other anthropogenic risks. 
Lessons	from	Wuhan	
We are still in the early stages of a pandemic episode whose eventual trajectory 
cannot be straightforwardly predicted. However, it is already possible to see striking 
differences in countries’ responses to it and to observe some trends. 
States differ in the aims they have adopted in managing the disease, on a spectrum 
ranging from repression to mitigation and accommodation. They also differ in the 
means used to implement these aims, from direct enforcement through regulatory 
instructions and criminal sanctions, to more indirect encouragement and 
persuasion. 
It is not yet possible to state with any certainty how differences in these responses 
may be related to their differing degrees of success in countering the effects of the 
virus but we can nonetheless identify some states that have experienced very low 
numbers of fatalities. The list is short, but contains countries from all continents. 
Several of these countries are in East Asia, including South Korea and Taiwan, where 
experience of the SARS 1 epidemic in 2003 might explain their rapid efforts to 
control SARS-CoV-2. The low numbers of cases in Uruguay, Denmark, Norway, 
Finland, Australia and New Zealand might in turn relate to their being democracies 
with relatively egalitarian distributions of income and wealth. 
The case of China is complex. It does not claim to be a liberal democracy, and its 
recent economic growth, while lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty, has 
created new inequalities. 
From the perspective of the West, the elimination of the virus in the city of Wuhan, 
where it was first identified, is generally taken to have been achieved through 
draconian interventions and coercion of a kind that could not be replicated 
elsewhere. 
A closer look at Wuhan of the kind we undertake in our paper ‘The Governance of 
COVID-19’ suggests that coercion is not the whole story. Support measures were 
also critical. 
According to the White Paper published by the State Council of the People’s 
Republic of China in June 2020, these measures included the dispatch of 346 medical 
teams composed of 42,600 medical workers and 965 public health workers from 
across the country to Hubei Province. During the peak of the testing carried out in 
Wuhan in February 2020, there were over 1,800 teams of epidemiologists in the city 
tracing tens of thousands of contacts. These actions were made possible by a 
concerted central government response, coupled with fiscal transfers and direct aid 
from provinces less exposed to the virus. 
Of course, the White Paper is the Chinese government’s account of its own 
performance, and so should be not be equated with an independent record of what 
happened. There is, however, already a significant body of research reporting on 
details of the Chinese response, including the role played by community-based 
contact tracing. Several eye witness accounts have also appeared. These point to the 
widespread presence of volunteers from across the country in Wuhan during the 
critical weeks of the crisis. There is no dispute that Wuhan had returned to 
something like normality by the summer of 2020. 
Lessons	from	history	
What happened in Wuhan, we suggest, has to some extent been misunderstood in 
the West. 
Early on, in March 2020, an article in Science characterised the measures taken there 
as ‘abhorrent in a free and just society’. However, it should be remembered that 
quarantines and cordons sanitaires have a long history in the West. 
Chinese commentators writing in the spring of 2020 saw in Wuhan a scaling up of 
the experience of the English village of Eyam, which engaged in a form of collective 
self-isolation in response to the arrival of the plague from London in 1665. The 
response of the villagers of Eyam may not have been entirely altruistic; it was 
common at this time for areas affected by the plague to be cordoned off by 
surrounding towns in return for the provision of supplies. 
Control was therefore combined with support. James I’s Plague Act of 1604 was 
aimed at the ‘relief and ordering of persons infested with the plague’ (our emphasis). 
There are many other European examples, up to and including the ‘Leicester model’ 
of disease control, dating from the 1890s, which the World Health Organization 
(WHO) later used as its template for the worldwide eradication of smallpox. 
We think that the wrong lesson to learn from Wuhan is that states must choose 
between doing nothing and allowing the virus to run its course, and coercive 
controls of the kind that suspend normal civil and commercial freedoms. 
Where	should	we	go	from	here?	
Making systematic cross-national comparisons is fraught with difficulties that make 
the identification of causal links between institutional interventions and health 
outcomes a problematic undertaking. However, some emerging trends can be 
identified that could help future governance of the risks we face in terms of 
allocating resources, making decisions and implementing policies. 
We make two suggestions of a general nature for thinking about the overall goals of 
governance: 
‘Normalising’ COVID-19 by treating it as a natural event that will eventually 
recede without the need for concerted action will not work very well for any 
state attempting it. This policy would make the disease endemic: as with smallpox 
and cholera in the relatively recent past. COVID-19 would become stable and in a 
sense manageable, but still a serious health risk to certain parts of the population, 
and a continuing drain on scarce resources. 
Policies that treat the virus and society alike as self-adjusting systems will not 
in practice lead to the hoped-for minimisation of state control. In the absence 
of a concerted public health response based on the logic of ‘find, test, trace, isolate 
and support’, periodic waves of the virus will be met by repeated lockdowns. These 
are likely to be accompanied by a renewed emphasis on the disciplining and control 
of the population. 
To avoid those negative outcomes, we make the following specific suggestions: 
To retain the trust of the population and avoid future social costs, 
quarantines and travel restrictions should be proportionate and limited. China 
has at no point attempted a national ‘lockdown’ and the WHO does not recommend 
it. Suspending normal civil and commercial activity carries a social cost, including 
negative health effects, which may be long term and so less salient in policy terms, 
but potentially highly damaging. 
Where they are adopted, control measures must be counterbalanced by 
support for households and communities. The UK’s Coronavirus Job Retention 
Scheme could be improved; our research shows that it supports businesses directly 
but household income only indirectly, and may not prevent mass redundancies 
going forward. 
Support is also critical to ‘test and trace’. Countries in which the government 
meets subsistence and accommodation costs for households undergoing self-
isolation have been more effective in driving down infection rates. 
Getting testing, tracing and support right will help avert serial lockdowns, 
and is best done at community level. The emerging evidence is that test and trace 
systems work best when delivered by local public health teams. Street-level 
community engagement is good at engendering trust; surveillance-using apps and 
big data, less so. Outsourcing to the private sector creates new layers of bureaucracy 
and unnecessary contracting costs.   
What’s	next?	
While the genetic mutation that produced the SARS-CoV-2 virus may have been a 
random occurrence, the pandemic that ensued was not. 
On the contrary, epidemics and pandemics have a recurring pattern throughout 
history that makes them statistically predictable. They are the combined effect of 
patterns in biological and human evolution. They are ‘anthropogenic’ events in the 
sense that they are triggered by the interaction of human activity with the wider 
environment, and the feedback effects brought about by commercial exploitation of 
natural resources, the spread of trade, movements of populations and widening of 
social inequalities. 
Finding an alternative path for governing should begin with rethinking currently 
influential accounts of governance and governmentality. 
Essential to this process is remembering that poverty and disease are neither natural 
phenomena nor the result of individual choices, but the consequences of human 
institutions, and that as such they have to be addressed institutionally. Re-learning 
how to manage risk through the welfare or social state can be a template for the 
future governance of anthropogenic crises, of which COVID-19 is likely just the 
harbinger. 
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